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Educational stratification has been a difficult subject to deal with having yet no study 
shown a quantitative measure of it. Using the idea of distribution comparison a measure 
based on parents’ education is built for the primary schools in Lisbon. Upon the 
confirmation that Lisbon is stratified, I use the measure of peer effects based on 
stratification and determine its impact on test scores, concluding that the existence of 
stratification improves scores of students in schools with more educated parents and 
decreases scores of students in schools with less educated parents. Moreover, using fixed 
effects I derive the conclusion that the measure of peers’ characteristics helps explain 
most of differences among schools. 
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1 Introduction
Education is at the basis of every modern society, playing a never-ending role in the status
attainment process. As is widely recognized the social background in which individuals grow
up signicantly determines later socioeconomic conditions. This positive relation is argued in
research on social stratication as being highly linked to educational performance (Duncan
and Hodge, 1963; Eckland, 1965). Thus, educational stratication exists as an area of interest
because of the recognized importance of educational institutions in the stratication systems
of societies (Hauser, 1970).
Previous research on socioeconomic stratication has identied three primary mechanisms
in which stratication of students occurs. First, stratication emerging from residential loca-
tion choices that is connected to school choice in the area of residence. Second, parental choices
to send children to private (or non-traditional public schools) rather than public schools and
lastly, public schools resort to sorting students through tracking policies.
The literature has been keen in analyzing educational stratication by determining the
impact of socioeconomic determinants on the success of students across schools. Stratication
in itself, however, is a dicult subject to grass having yet no study on educational grounds
tried to nd a quantitative measure of it.
Basing myself on the stratication literature, more specically Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991),
I try to make the rst steps into this subject by obtaining a measure of school population
characteristics. This is done by distribution comparison for primary schools in Lisbon, looking
for the dierence between school and city population. Such was employed based upon parents'
education for its vital link to children' achievements. Of this analysis, there is the conrmation
in the idea that Lisbon is at some degree stratied. This method however, does not return
school levels of stratication rather than just a big picture of what the city looks like and
because of the way it is obtained, at its core seen as a peer eect.
Also, to infer on the eect on test scores a standard education production function model
is applied arriving to the conclusion that as stratication exists, students in schools with more
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educated parents tend to perform better and students in schools will less educated parents
worse.
This report is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the relevant literature on the
matter. Section 3 provides a review of the Portuguese primary education system. The dataset
is presented in section 4, as well as a brief summary of the data. Section 5 discusses the
concept of stratication while section 6 deals with the proposed measure. Section 7 details an
empirical framework and its results and a conclusion is given in Section 8.
2 Literature Review
On the topic of educational stratication there have been three distinct paths addressed
in the literature. First, families may self-select into dierent traditional public schools since
housing markets encourage residential segregation which in turn results in school-level strat-
ication. Second, some families may select out of traditional public schools in the presence
of private or nontraditional public schools. Finally, traditional public schools themselves may
choose to sort students through tracking.
Hoxby (2000) and Urquiola (2005), based on the Tiebout variation, document that resi-
dential choices by parents result in a nonrandom stratication of students across public schools
that vary in inputs and outcomes. Moreover, on the margin, parent's choices regarding dis-
tricts of residence do aect their children's peer groups but most of the segregation along race
and income happens at the school, not the district level. Furthermore, "resulting increases in
district homogeneity have little net eect on achievement, per-pupil spending, or productivity"
(Hoxby, 2000).
In the debate of school choice, the argument is given that public schools are inecient
local monopolies, educational quality would improve if parents were allowed to freely choose
between schools. Yet, while acknowledging the potential positive eects of school choice, its
eects on inequality are a concern, especially for those students remaining in the public sector,
resulting choice in greater segregation of students by ability and socioeconomic background.
Empirically there has been a consensus that choice might result in higher segregation.
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Scholars acknowledging this have claimed that "if choice leads to a higher degree of sorting
by income and ability and peer eects matter, then, the distribution of educational benets
is likely to be quite unequal" (Epple & Romano, 1998; Epple, Figlio, & Romano, 2004).
Moreover, Epple, Figlio, & Romano (2004) presents evidence that conrm the results of the
theoretical model developed in Epple & Romano (1998) that private schools engage in price
discrimination that leads to sorting on observed ability within the private sector, with the
highest income and highest ability students in the top private schools. Lankford and Wyckott
(2001) also conclude, by estimating a model of public-private school choice, that students who
choose to move to private schools are some what dierent from public school pupils left behind
on academic and family dimensions.
At school level, Bifulco and Ladd, (2006) and Saporito, (2003) claim increased ethnic and
racial stratication between schools as a consequence of school choice because parents tend
to choose schools with racial and economic compositions similar to their own backgrounds.
Saporito (2003) looks at magnet schools, nding no empirical evidence that choice policies
reduce segregation by race and class, even arguing the opposite. He also postulates that the
choices of white and wealthier students lead to increased racial and economic segregation in
the neighborhood schools that these students leave. For charter schools in North Carolina,
Bifulco and Ladd (2006) conclude that sorting of students based on racial and socioeconomic
background contributed to the poor performance of these schools.
Research on countries where the national voucher systems operates, such as Chile and Swe-
den, also arrive to the conclusion that choice increases stratication. Böhlmark and Lindahl
(2007) analyze the educational reform occurred in Sweden in 1992, where the country tran-
sited from a assigning students to their closest public school to a system allowing free choice
between public and private schools. They concluded that, the competitive forces of the reform
induced higher achievement but also higher segregation for migrant students as parents with
higher levels of education tend to choose private schools for their children. Likewise, in Chile,
it is argued that the voucher program led to increase sorting, as the best public school students
left for private schools (cream-skimming). (Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006; McEwan, Urquiola and
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Vegas, 2008; Mizala and Torche, 2010;) Moreover, Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) state that the
shift to the private sector did not produce achievement gains.
In a dierent spectrum, public schools frequently attempt to provide dierentiated prod-
ucts within individual schools whether trough partial or complete tracking. In most educa-
tional systems students are placed in distinct tracks or curricular programs. At the secondary
level, the most common distinction is between the academic tracks that prepare students for
higher education, and those tracks that prepare them for immediate entry into the labor force.
Track placement is determined largely by the students' prior achievements. But because stu-
dent achievements are correlated with their socioeconomic origins, especially with parent's
educational attainment, students from less privileged strata are more likely to attend non-
academic tracks (Heyns, 1974; Alexander, Cook and McDill, 1978; Rees, Argys and Brewert,
1996). Track placement, in turn, aects their subsequent educational attainment and enlarges
inequality between social strata in subsequent attainments.
The issue of ability tracking was most directly approached by Epple, Newlon and Romano
(2002), whose model exogenously set levels of tracking within public schools and demonstrates
that tracking serves to retain relatively high-income, higher-ability students who qualify for
the higher track, meaning that tracking on the part of public schools results in a more intense
competition for higher-ability students.
3 Portuguese Primary Education
The choice to focus on primary education stems for it being the basis of the educational
system, where every individual is introduced into the basic studies. This analysis of stratica-
tion right at the earliest stage of education seemed the right approach since its possible eects
on every other stage stage given the cumulative power of education. Also, in primary schools
the same curriculum is oered to all students, existing no tracking.
In Portugal, basic education encompasses nine years of schooling, being compulsory and
divided into three cycles. It follows a National Curriculum whose standards are dened in the
form of general and specic competences. The rst cycle of basic education covers years 1st
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to 4th, the second cycle years 5th to 6th and the third cycle years 7th to 9th. For the purpose
of this work the focus will be on the 1st cycle of basic education which is taught in public or
private primary schools.
The enrollment in the 1st year of primary education is compulsory for children who are
six years old by 15 September. However, guardians of children who reach six between 16
September and December 31, may submit an application to the school governing body to
be allowed for registration in that school year, being the latter conditional upon vacancy.
Moreover, all students who attend primary schools have to take national exams at the end of
the cycle (4th grade), not having, in the time period in analysis, a weight on students nal
grade1. The grading system goes from 1 to 5, being the threshold to pass the exam equal to
3.
4 Data
The dataset used in this empirical study includes information about students attending
primary public and private schools in Portugal from 2007 to 2012. The set of variables allows us
to know what school a given student is in each year, his grade, as well as personal information
about themselves and their parents. Moreover, it is possible to combine this with achievements,
using the JNE (Júri Nacional de Exames) database, providing test scores on national exams
that occur at the end of 4th grade.
The choice to focus on public schools comes, rst of all from the richness of the data, that
having information for private schools is much more extensive for the public sector. Also,
public schools are free of charge (no tuitions), so I look at stratication that is the result
of other mechanisms dierent from price. Apart from this, the data was restricted to the
municipality of Lisbon. It makes only sense to test stratication within a delimited region
where children may be allocated to dierent schools in dierent ways and Lisbon seemed an
excellent case to start with for its great diversity steaming from being the capital city, having
a large number of public primary schools; around 90, which is highly important given that
1From 2013 on such exams will have a weight on the student nal grade
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stratication is easier to occur, and therefore test, as the number of schools increases because
the easier it is for pupils to be aggregated with similar peers.
Having this into account, there are 92 680 students in 91 primary schools in Lisbon during
the time period in analysis. Moreover, the JNE database includes 20 104 observations for 4th
grade students in Lisbon. A table with summary statistics can be seen below. The percentages
of females among primary and 4th grade students is around 48%, while immigrant students
account for 7%, while the percentage of subsidized-lunch students is 40%. Also, average test
scores for Portuguese and Mathematics are quite similar and around 3, while the percentage
of failed students is much higher for Mathematics.






Age (in years) 9.37 7.84
Female (%) 47.83 47.45
Immigrant (%) 7.26 7.03
Subsidized-lunch (%) 39.84 39.83
Family Background
Immigrant parents (%) (a) 16.84 17.87
Parents' highest level of
education (%) (b)
Primary or less 27.04 37.08
2nd cycle of basic school 12.17 13.57
3rd cycle of basic school 21.75 15.78
Secondary education 21.52 14.74
Higher education 17.52 18.83
Unemployed parents (a) 21.32 22.34
Test scores
Test scores math 3.19 -
Test scores portuguese 3.15 -
Fail math (%) 13.34 -
Fail portuguese (%) 6.1 -
No. Observations 20104 92680
Note: This reports summary statistics (mean) for the 2007-2012 period for age and test score results. Other variables
are expressed as a percentage. The units are explained in front of the variables. (a) at least one parent; (b) average of
both parents
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5 The concept of stratication - descriptive data
In its essence, stratication is the division of a society into a number of strata, hierarchically
arranged groupings and groups form well-dened strata to the extent that their members
dier from the rest of the population 2. Before entering in the measurement of these eects
one needs to start from the basics and see how students are distributed across schools in
Lisbon.
To do so, a characterization of schools based upon key socioeconomic variables of interest
such as parents' education, nationality and subsidized-lunch3 is foremost important. The
point being to observe the variability across schools because from the notion of stratication
presented above, if schools are essentially the same in terms of students' characteristics there
is no point to talk about stratication because there would be none: pupils in each school
would be the same as the rest of the population.
In light of this, for each school I looked at the % of students whose parents have at most
the 9th grade; the % of students with parents with at least an undergraduate degree; the % of
students with non-Portuguese parents and lastly the % of students with subsidized-lunch 4.
A rst glance at these variables provide the conclusion that there is, in fact, variability
between schools, as can be seen in the graphs below. For instance in 2012 5, some schools
bear 80% of students whose parents have at most the 9th grade, being such schools associated
with poorer/more problematic areas of Lisbon. On the other side of the coin, schools that
have students with more educated parents are located in better areas of Lisbon and few are
the schools in which 40% of students whose parents have an undergraduate degree. For kids
of immigrant parents, most schools encompass less than 20% of them, being, nevertheless, the
higher percentages in this measure related with schools where parents are less educated and
consistent with studies that show that the area of the historic center of Lisbon is the location
2Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991)
3Called, SASE (Serviços de Acção Social) in Portugal. It is divided into 3 levels, A, B and no-sase
4From this, it is essential to exclude schools in which observations are not available or unknown. This
requires losing information, being the analysis susceptible to the variable of interest in use. In table A1 from
the appendix it is possible to check how much information is lost when characterizing schools for each of the
measures mentioned above.
5The result are quite similar to other years in terms of direction of the analysis done for 2012.
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with stronger concentration of foreign populations6 .
Figure 1: Characterization of schools
(a) % of students per school with parents
with at most the 9th grade, in 2012
(b) % of students per school with parent
with at least an undergraduate degree, in
2012
(c) % of students per school with non-
Portuguese parents, in 2012
(d) % of students per school with
subsidized-lunch, in 2012
The striking idea given by these statistics is that there is scope to analyze educational
stratication in Lisbon schools. As a starting point on measuring stratication I decided
to focus the analysis onto one key characteristic which according to the literature is highly
inuential on pupils' achievements: parents' education (Hanushek, 1986).
The most straightforward explanation for the connection between parents' education and
their children's academic achievement is that parents absorb something during schooling that
ends up inuencing their values and knowledge impacting the the ways of interaction with
kids about school. Also, more educated parents usually have higher expectations for their
children's education, thus predicting greater educational attainment for these kids (Alexander
et al., 1994).
Moreover, education inuences family choices, the types of jobs both parents are likely
6Hortas, Martins and Dias (2014)
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to have and, thus income and living opportunities, which impacts the types of school and
neighborhood that their children will be exposed to (Coleman, 1987), that directly inuence
children's educational achievement.
To properly analyze the distribution of students according to parents' education I aggre-
gated the several levels of education, combining higher, secondary, and several steps of basic
education (without qualications and 1st, 2nd and 3rd cycles).
The stacked graph below from 2012 (being quite similar for all years) shows the percentage
of students, in each school, with fathers7 with a given level of education, it has been sorted by
the lowest level of education, in a way that the schools more to the right have more students
with less educated parents. It seems to exist a polarization at the highest and lowest level of
education: there are at one end a few schools with really well educated parents and at the
other schools with poorly educated parents. Nevertheless, this shows both huge variability
and that there is no perfect stratication: the large majority of schools have parents with all
levels of education.
Figure 2: % of students by school with fathers at a certain level of education, in
2012
6 Measuring Stratication
The rst prominent thought in deriving a measure that allows looking at stratication streams
from comparing distributions following the reasoning of Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991). Thus,
7similarly for mothers
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it should try to provide answers for the following question: How much does the distribution of
parents' education in a school diverge from the municipality distribution? Putting in another
way, students distributed in a way that their peers are much like their own (in terms of
parents' education) but diering from the general population? Moreover, in this analysis the
database was restricted to students for which information on parents' education was available
(accounting for 67% of the existing information for Lisbon).
To address this, one should rst look at the position (rank) of students within their own
school and the students' position in the overall population, in this case among the total primary
students of Lisbon.
Let yij be the combined years of parents' education8 of student i in school j, with n
members. The rank (r) of the parents' education (ranked from less to more educated) will
give us the position of student i among all students in a given school, for example, if student
i is the one with less educated parents he will be ranked one in his school while the best will
be the nth student. It is, nevertheless, vital to look at a percent rank to be able to compare
both results the student position in the school and in the whole population, using the formula,
PR = (r−1)/(n−1), in order to yield for the unique middle the value of 0.5 when the sample size
is odd and treating tails symmetrically. This approach, returns values between 0 and 1, where
zero reports the worst ranked student (with less educated parents). Such was employed both
at school (PRij) and population level (PRip). Moreover, for a given student, the key is, thus,
to look at the dierence between both ranks:
Fi = PRij − PRip (1)
Also, to clearly examine how much the distribution of a given school diverges from the
municipality the nal measure should account for how all students of a school perform within
the school versus their performance within the city. To do so, one should look at the sum of
all dierences between these ranks and normalize it by taking into account school size.








, where the sum is over all students in school j.
From here it is to expect that, for schools that have students with less educated parents,
the school rank of students is higher than the overall one, returning positive values of Fi.
Antagonistically, for schools that that have students with more educated parents, the overall
rank always surpasses school ranks, being Fi negative. To better understand this, take two
schools, the very best in the city, with more educated parent and the very worst, meaning
schools located at the extremes of the city distribution. The average ranked student in the
worst school would be much closer to the bottom in the whole population (school rank>city
rank), while the average ranked student in the best is much closer to the top overall (city
rank>school rank). Furthermore, Sj returns values between -1 and 1.
It would be expected that in the absence of stratication in the city, all schools would
achieve values near zero, having no dierences between the ranks of students in the school and
their rank in the overall population, essentially all students in the city would be similar. there
seems to be evidence conrming the idea that Lisbon is stratied. There is higher segregation
at the extremes, with a gathering of a few schools with most educated parents and schools
with the least educated, while the other schools in the city appear to have a more or less
uniform pattern between them, even with perfect stratication schools in the middle of the
distribution would have Sj near 0.
Figure 3: Sjby school
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It is to mention, however, that Sj does not provide a per school value of stratication. It is
only possible to infer on the stratication of the city: taken together, the values for all schools
are an indicator proving information that there is some kind of stratication in the Lisbon
because they dier from zero, but we do not know its size or if a given school is more stratied
than another. The measure may be understood as a measure of peers' characteristics, because
the essence of its calculation: it is because stratication exists that students are aggregated
into schools as they are.
Another and simpler way of thinking about stratication would be just to look at the aver-
age education of parents per school. Nevertheless, it does not allow to take into consideration
the heterogeneity within schools as comparing the distribution between school and city does,
for the fact that we can achieve the same average results with really homogeneous schools or
with schools that, being quite heterogeneous, bear the loads of the extreme values.
It is also interesting to look for stratication in the outputs rather than just the inputs
of educational achievement, and check if there is a matching pattern or not between the two.
To do so, the process implemented with parents' education was repeated for test scores. The
graphs below show the characterization of schools according to the grading levels (sorted by
the negative grades), showing also a great variability across schools.
Figure 4: % of students by school with each of the test score levels
(a) For Portuguese test (b) For Mathematics test
Adding information on test scores conditional on the measure of peer eects based on
stratication (Sj) shown below, one concludes that schools with less educated parents seem to
perform worse (Sj>0), as the percentage of negative test scores in mathematics is 18% (16%
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for Portuguese) higher when comparing to schools with more educated parents (Sj<0). Also,
the highest score is signicantly lower by 11% (6.7%).
Table 2: Highest and lowest test scores percentages in Portuguese and Mathematics conditional
















Apart from this, to see if Lisbon is also stratied by achievements and to compare it to the
pattern of stratication found before (for parents' education), the same logic in measurement
was employed but using now as input test scores instead of parents' education. This means
that it accounts for how much the distribution of test scores in a given school diverges from
the distribution of the city. The graphs below show the combination of both results being
sorted by the one using parents' education.
Figure 5: Stratication measure by parents education and test scores
(a) Comparison between stratication
measure by parents education and math
test score sorted by the parents education
one
(b) Comparison between stratication
measure by parents education and por-
tuguese test score sorted by the parents
education one
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By looking at them one can see that it also seems to exist some sort stratication by
achievement being the pattern not followed by the one found for parents' education. Never-
theless these results, provide the conclusion that students are segregated in Lisbon by their
parents' education but if the variation in achievement is a consequence of this (which we
don't know) than there is not necessarily a segregation by achievement. This is just the out-
come. But how does stratication inuences test scores? For this, one will apply the empirical
framework discussed below.
7 Empirical Framework and Results
To examine the eect of stratication on test scores a standard education production function
model is applied. This estimate test scores, as a function of the cumulative impact of school
inputs, the peers of the student, their individual characteristics and family. The model to be
estimated is:
Tijkt = Xijtβ + γDjt + δSjt + εijkt (3)
where Tijkt is the test score for student i at school j for subject k in year t, Xijt is a
vector of individual and family background inuences, Djt is vector of school inputs, Sjt is
the measure of peer characteristics based on stratication as mentioned before and, εijkt is an
error term.
The baseline regression was estimated with results showed further below. The dependent
variable is either the test score from 1 to 5 on national exam in Mathematics or Portuguese.
Age refers to students' age until September of the school year. Gender is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the student is female and zero otherwise.
Following the reasoning of Chiswick and DebBurman (2003) that immigrant generation
are signicantly important for educational achievement, the variable Immigrant was gener-
ated, being equal to 0 if the student is Portuguese of Portuguese parents (native), 1 (second
generation immigrant) if the student was born in Portugal from foreign-born parents and 2
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(rst generation immigrant) if the student is foreign born from at least one foreign-born parent.
Subsidized-lunch is divided into three categories, 0 referencing to students with no help,
1 for intermediate students and 2 for students with the highest level of subsidy. Parents'
employment situation varies from 1  Employed, 2  Unemployed, 3  Student, 4  Retired
and 5  Other. Parents' education is the combining years of education (average) of both
parents for each student and lastly, Sjt is the measure of peer characteristics . There were also
included as controls dummy variables for years.







































































Year dummies YES YES
R2 0.2907 0.2468
Adj-R2 0.2896 0.2456
No. Obs. 13347 13347
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** - signicant at 5%, * - signicant at 10%
As shown by the results above for Mathematics and Portuguese test scores students' age,
gender, subsidized-lunch allocation, parents' education, immigration and the stratication
measure are highly signicant. Students that have subsidized-lunch tend to underperform
while comparing to students that don't. Such result is expected, as students with such aid
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are from poorer or more troubled families, factors that are recognized to negatively inuence
children' achievement.
Moreover, as age increases by 1 year, the test score is expected to decrease by 0.2, ceteris
paribus. Age is also capturing students that are repeating school years, thus making sense such
result. Also, being a girl hurts test scores in Mathematics but signicantly increases scores
in Portuguese. Being rst or second generation immigrant also hurts changes of better grade
while compare it to native students but surprisingly enough the eect is lower for Portuguese.
The striking and crucial result is that students in schools that diverge from the city distribution
negatively, tend to perform worse: the fact that there is stratication improves test scores of
students in the schools with more educated parents and decreases scores of those in schools
with less educated parents.
Furthermore, is also important to realize that including both the parent's education for
each student and the measure of stratication that is based upon this variable returns results
of signicance for both of them, proving that in their essence they are measuring dierent
impacts.
As mentioned before, another way of looking at stratication would be just to apply an
average of parents' education by school. In reality, this is highly correlated (-0.97) with my
measure, so they both capture the same explanatory eect, however, also as stated before,
averages do not allow heterogeneity among schools to be felt, and moreover, when including
both variables and parents' education on the baseline regression it is the average education
that loses signicance, which empowers the measure of peers based on stratication as having
more explanatory power in determining achievement 9.
At this point one already tackled the most important issue of this work: Lisbon is stratied
and the measure of characteristics of the school population based on stratication signicantly
inuence test scores. Nevertheless, the explanatory power of the model showed above (29% of
the variation in mathematics test scores are explained by the variation in the model, 24% for
Portuguese) makes us question what else is beyond this. What more explains the variability
of test scores? Is it more prominent within or between schools?
9To see the result of the model with both variables please check Table A2 in the appendix.
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First of all, how much of test scores is explained by Sj itself? Running a simple regression
one discovers that 17.97% of the variation in mathematics test scores (13.06% for Portuguese)
is explained by the variation in this peer measure. This number is quite signicant and more
relevant for Mathematics than Portuguese, which may be because schools are relevant and
peers matter more given hardness of the subject. But being this something schools cannot
control, how much do schools really matter to explain achievement? Do they add more than
this? Many authors have concluded that schools matter but not as much as other factors for
resins that are not yet clear.
Since school eects are potentially unobservable they should, therefore, not rely solely on
observable characteristics. For this reason, a model with school xed eects deals better with
such situation. The xed eects ϕj to be a group specic constant term in the regression
equation:
Tijkt = ϕj +Xijtβ + εijkt (4)
The term ϕj is presumed to capture the unobservable that dierentiate school units. Ba-
sically, this implies that all dierences between schools are xed over time and represented as
parametric shifts of the regression function. Thus, every variable that is school specic cannot
enter the model. Since we are not dealing with panel data, this can be achieved by adding
school dummy variables.
Tijkt = Xijtβ + ϕ1D1 + ϕ2D2 + ...+ ϕnDn + εijkt (5)
Where Di1 is 1 when j=1 and 0 otherwise, Di2 is 1 when j=2 and 0 otherwise, and so on,
being just dummy variables indicating the groups in the xed eects model above.
Applying this logic, but using only school xed eects and no other explanatory variables10
, 25.48% of the variability in Math (19.51% for Portuguese) test scores is explained by the
variability in school eects. This leads us to conclude that more than 75% of test scores
variation is explained, not between schools but within each school. This appears to go in
10There is nevertheless, the need to use year dummies as controls in all of these steps.
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line with the literature in the matter of school eects where Kramarz, Machin and Ouazad
(2009) concluded pupil heterogeneity to be a more important determinant of achievement
than school quality even though both inputs were statistically signicant.
By comparing results of both models, where the school variable is regarded as being either
the measure of peer eects (Sj) or the xed eects we take a lesson that schools encompasses
more than just peer eects. Looking at the R-squared reported above for the simplest speci-
cation possible, schools add around 7.5% (for Math the R-squared goes from 17.97 to 25.48).
To further stress this point, some specications were done, taking as control parents' educa-
tion. From the table below, reporting the R and adjusted R-squared we can also infer on the
signicant eect of parents' education on kids' achievement. Including this into de models
helps explain more 6 to 8% of the variability in test scores (for Math, for instance, in the
model with peer eects, R-squared moves from 17.97 to 26.66, while for xed eects it changes
to 31.25 from the previous 25.48).
Table 4: R2 and adjusted R2 of specication models
Mathematics test score Portuguese test score
Parents'
education
R2 Adj-R2 R2 Adj-R2
Sj - 17.97 17.94 13.06 13.03
Sj Yes 26.66 26.62 20.01 19.97
School xed eects - 25.48 25.12 19.51 19.13
School xed eects Yes 31.25 30.78 22.96 22.44




33.17 32.69 27.23 26.71
Note: all tests have as controls year dummies
If we further develop the xed eect model adding variables found highly signicant before
such as subsidized-lunch, age and gender the variability of test scores in math is now explained
by 33% of the model variability, a gain of around 2%.This nal specication of the xed eects
model is reported below where one can see that all variables are highly signicant and follow
the directional eect in explaining achievement found before.
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Year dummies YES YES
R2 0.3317 0.2723
Adj-R2 0.3269 0.2671
No. Obs. 13760 13760
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** - signicant at 5%, * - signicant at 10%
To conclude, even though stratication exists in Lisbon and the peer measure that streams
from it signicantly determines how students perform there is more to the story than that.
School eects do not only depend on this. Nevertheless, peers explains much of the dierences
between schools (the explanatory power provided only by peer eects accounts for 70% of
the one arrived for school xed eects). Furthermore, there is clearly more variation within
schools than across them, which is in line with the literature ndings that pupil heterogeneity
matter more, that may be the reason why the pattern of stratication of inputs and outputs
does not match.
8 Conclusion
For the purpose of assessing stratication in primary schools in Lisbon, I developed a measure
based on parents' education. This measure is grounded on distribution comparison between
school and city population. It provides something that can be interpreted as a measure of
peers' characteristics and its per school values provide an indicator that there is some degree
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of stratication in Lisbon.
Further, to infer on the impact of stratication in student achievement a standard education
production function model was applied controlling for students characteristics, socioeconomic
background and the measure of peer characteristics. The estimates were signicantly clear on
the negative impact of the measure of peer characteristics (that depends upon the existence
of stratication) on test scores for both Portuguese and Mathematics. To further stress school
eects and see if test score variability was higher among or between schools, a model of xed
eects was performed deriving the result that 75% of test scores variation is explained not
between but within schools and that stratication itself helps explain the majority of the
variability across schools. This is a striking result, since it helps detangle part of what can
been seen as school quality into something schools themselves cannot really control and be of
help to policy makers. Also, the measure of peers' characteristics has more explanatory power
than the simple average of parents' education.
In a nutshell, there is stratication and the fact that it exists negatively aects students test
scores in the schools where students' parents are less educated, helping explain the majority
of the variability across schools.
The relevant contribution of this paper, even with all its simplicity, is in it being one
of the rst to approach educational stratication by trying to quantify it, being a start for
future research. In the future, it would be relevant to use other datasets in order to check the
robustness of the measure, applying it using other socioeconomic variables or a combination
of them. Further it should also be applied, in the case of Portugal, to other municipalities to
see how regional dierences play a role in educational stratication. Moreover, as it cannot be
stated that stratication decreases (or increases) students' per se, changing the stratication
degree would aect students dierently depending on the schools they are enrolled in and on
their characteristics, which would also be something interesting to look at.
20
References
[1] Alenxander, K.L., Entwisle, D.R. and Bedinger, S.D. 1994. When expectations work:
race and socioeconomic dierences in school performance, Social Psychology Quarterly,
57(4), 283-299
[2] Alexander, K. L., Cook, M. and McDill, E. L. 1978. "Curriculum Tracking and Educa-
tional Stratication: Some Further Evidence", American Sociological Review Vol. 43, No.
1, pp. 47-66
[3] Bifulco, R., & Ladd, H. F. 2006. The impacts of charter schools on student achievement:
Evidence from North Carolina. Education Finance and Policy, 1(1), 50-90
[4] Böhlmark, A., & Lindahl, M. 2007. The impact of school choice on pupil achievement,
segregation and costs: Swedish evidence. (Discussion Paper No. 2786)
[5] Chiswick, Barry R., & Noyna DebBurman. 2004. Educational Attainment: Analysis by
Immigrant Generation, 23 Economics of Education Rev. 36179.
[6] Coleman, J.S. 1987. Families and Schools, Educational Researcher, 16, 32-38
[7] Duncan, Otis Dudley and Robert W. Hodge 1963 "Education and occupational mobility:
A regression analysis." American Journal of Sociology 68:629-644.
[8] Eckland, Bruce K.1965 "Academic ability, higher education, and occupational mobility."
American Sociological Review 30: 735-746.
[9] Epple, D., & Romano, R. 1998. "Competition between private and public schools, vouch-
ers, and peer-group eects" The American Economic Review, 88(1), 33 - 62.
[10] Epple, D., Figlio, D. and Roamno, R. 2004. Competition between private and public
schools: Testing stratication and pricing predictions, NBER Working Paper Series,
No.7956, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
[11] Epple, D., Newlon, E., Romano, R. 2002. Ability tracking, school competition, and the
distribution of educational benets. Journal of Public Economics 83, 148.
[12] Gamoran, A. 1987. "The stratication of high school learning opportunities", Sociology
of Education, 60, 135-155.
[13] Hanushek, E. A. 1986. The economics of schooling: Production and eciency in public
schools, Journal of Economic Literature XXIV, 1141{1177. Hauser, R. 1970. "Educa-
tional Stratication in the United States." Sociological Inquiry 40:102-129
[14] Heyns, B. 1974. "Social Selection and Stratication Within Schools" American Journal
of Sociology Vol. 79, No. 6, pp. 1434-1451
[15] Hortas, M.; Martins, C. and Dias, A. 2014. Escola, Comunidade E Território: Dinâmicas
Educativas Locais Na Integração De Populações Imigrantes Na Área Metropolitana De
Lisboa, INTERACÇÕES NO. 29, PP. 8-36.
21
[16] Hoxby, C. M. 2000. Does competition among public schools benet students and taxpay-
ers? American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 5, pp.1209-38
[17] Hsieh, C.T. and Urquiola, M. 2006. "The eects of generalized school choice on achieve-
ment and stratication: Evidence from Chile's school voucher program", with Chang-Tai
Hsieh, Journal of Public Economics
[18] Kramarz, F., Machin, S., Ouazad, A., 2009. What Makes a Test Score? The Respective
Contributions of Pupils, Schools and Peers in Achievement in English Primary Education.
CEE Discussion Paper 102.
[19] Lankford, H. and Wycko, J., 2001. "Who Would Be Left Behind by Enhanced Private
School Choice?" Journal of Urban Economics, Volume 50, Issue 2, Pages 288312
[20] McEwan, P., M. Urquiola, and E. Vegas. 2008. School choice, stratication, and infor-
mation on school performance: Lessons from Chile, Economia, 8(2), 127.
[21] Mizala, A., & Torche, F. 2010. Bringing the schools back in: The stratication of educa-
tional achievement in the Chilean voucher system. International Journal of Educational
Development, 53, 132-144
[22] Nunes, Luís Catela, Portela, Miguel and Reis, Hugo. 2014. Manual Da Base De Dados
MISI Anonimizada Documento de Trabalho
[23] Nunes, Luís Catela; Pereira, Diogo; Reis, Ana Balcão; Rodrigues, Guilherme and Seabra,
Maria do Carmo. 2014. Manual De Ligação Entre Registos De Alunos Na MISI - Período
2006/07=2011/12. Documento de Trabalho
[24] Rees, Daniel I. & Argys, Laura M. & Brewer, Dominic J., 1996. "Tracking in the United
States: Descriptive statistics from NELS," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol.
15(1), pages 83-89, February.
[25] Saporito, S. 2003. Private choices, public consequences: Magnet school choice and seg-
regation by race and poverty. Social Problems, 50(2), 181-203.
[26] Urquiola, M. 2005. Does school choice lead to sorting? Evidence from Tiebout variation,
I 95 (4): 1310  1326
[27] Yitzhaki, Sh. & Lerman, R. I. 1991. `Income stratication and income inequality', Review
of Income and Wealth, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 31329.
22
Appendix
Table A1 - No of possible observations for each variable and in which the
characterization of schools is based upon
1st cycle in Lisbon Parents' education Nationality Subsidized-lunch
#students #schools #students #schools #students #schools #students #schools
2007 15100 82 9848 79 15050 82 15100 82
2008 15564 81 10172 81 15425 81 15459 81
2009 15760 84 10498 82 15663 83 15197 84
2010 15588 85 10641 83 15516 85 15588 85
2011 15339 89 10485 84 15296 88 15339 89
2012 15329 89 10796 89 15242 89 15329 89
92680 62440 92192 92012












































































Year dummies YES YES
R2 0.2865 0.2468
Adj-R2 0.2855 0.2456
No. Obs. 13347 13347
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** - signicant at 5%, * - signicant at 10%
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